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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DENVER AND RIO GRANDE WEST-
ERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Del-
aware corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
8754 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will sometimes be designated in this brief 
as follows: Plaintiff and Appellant, State of Utah, by and 
through its Road Commission, as the "Road Commission", 
Defendant and Respondent, Denver and Rio Grande West-
ern Railroad Company, as the "Rio Grande". Emphasis 
has been supplied. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a very narrow question. The prob-
lem is simply whether the trial court erred in denying the 
application of the Road Commission, on summary motion to 
occupy and thereby to seize and destroy Rio Grande's Little 
Cottonwood Branch of railroad. The trial court has never 
considered or determined the ultimate rights of the parties. 
The issues to be resolved in determining those rights must 
await the trial of the case. The court below simply refused, 
under the showing made on the preliminary motion, to 
authorize the Road Commission immediately to occupy the 
premises sought to be condemned. In this we believe the 
trial court acted with manifest propriety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While there is no substantial issue of fact, we believe 
the statement as presented by counsel for the Road Com-
mission does not sufficiently advise the court of the essen-
tial facts involved. For this reason, respondent presents 
the following statement of facts. 
Rio Grande is a common carrier of persons and prop-
erty by rail in intrastate and interstate commerce. Its main 
line of railroad from Salt Lake City to Colorado points runs 
in a north and south direction generally along the center 
of the Salt Lake Valley. In the City of Midvale this main 
line crosses at grade an east and west street known as 
Center Street. Near the point of this crossing two branch 
lines of Rio Grande's railroad are taken out from its main 
line (Exhibit P-1). 
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One of these branches known as the "Little Cotton-
wood Branch" is taken out of the main line immediately 
south of Center Street and runs in an easterly direction 
abutting the south side of Center Street on premises owned 
in fee by Rio Grande a distance of some 3,000 feet and then 
extends southerly crossing State Street and serving indus-
tries on the east side of State Street. This branch line 
extends approximately 1.75 miles and has approximately 
.43 miles of side tracks. It had for the year 1957 an assessed 
valuation of $6,525.00. This branch line presently serves 
directly an oil company and a coal company, and through 
a team track a rock wool company and a builders supply 
company. The oil company and the coal company produced 
approximately $21,500.00 in gross freight revenue in 1956. 
The companies served by the team track produced some 
ten cars of freight in the same period ( R. 28, 36, 82-83) . 
Taking out of said main line immediately north of 
Center Street, Rio Grande has another branch line known 
as the "Bingham and Garfield Branch", which runs west-
erly down Center Street of Midvale and serves mines and 
industries in the Bingham and Garfield area (R. 77). 
Center Street is a road designated by statute as a part 
of the State Road System and is under the jurisdiction of 
the State Road Commission. The right of way owned in 
fee by Rio Grande for its Little Cottonwood Branch is 
approximately 27 feet in width and abuts along and runs 
Parallel to the south side of Center Street for a distance 
of approximately 3,000 feet. Abutting upon the south side 
of such right of way are residential properties owned by 
residents of the City of Midvale (Exhibit P-1). The tracks 
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of Rio Grande on its Little Cottonwood Branch are elevated 
above the street level of Center Street some 6 to 13 inches 
(R. 46). The Road Commission, Midvale City and Rio 
Grande have since 1954 been considering a plan for the 
improvement of Center Street from the point where it 
crosses Rio Grande's main line easterly to State Street, 
whereby the tracks of Rio Grande on this branch would be 
lowered, and the entire area paved over and used as part 
of Center Street. After considerable negotiation the form 
of agreement for carrying out such plan was approved by 
the Road Commission and on January 10, 1957, transmitted 
to Rio Grande for execution. Rio Grande executed the same 
and transmitted it to the Road Commission on July 19, 
1957. The Road Commission never signed the agreement 
(Exhibits D-3 through D-11). Prior to transmitting the 
form of agreement to Rio Grande for the lowering and pav-
ing over of its tracks on Center Street, the Road Commis-
sion in October or November, 1956, entered into a contract 
for the improvement of Center Street under Project 1580. 
The construction under this contract has now been com-
pleted. The project for lowering Rio Grande's tracks and 
paving over has never been carried out although it could 
be completed in about thirty days time (R. 27, 85). 
After having arrived at a basis of agreement with 
Rio Grande for the lowering of its tracks and the paving 
over of the track area the Road Commission changed its 
mind about completing the street project and asserted that 
the Little Cottonwood Branch should be removed and de-
stroyed in its entirety. This Rio Grande was unwilling 
to do, and the Road Commission brought this action to 
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condemn the entire branch. The reason assigned for such 
change of position on the part of the Road Commission is 
the Valley Freeway Project No. 1-01-7 (3) (R. 41-43). 
Project 1-01-7 (3) involves the construction of a free-
way which will be a part of the interstate road system under 
the Highway Act of 1956. This freeway will enter Salt 
Lake City at a point known generally as the Beck's Over-
pass near the Davis County line and will extend southerly 
through Salt Lake County. The tentative proposal for lo-
cation contemplates that this freeway will be easterly of 
and near Rio Grande's main line at the point where the 
freeway crosses Center Street (R. 30-31, Exhibit P-1). 
Three problems require solution in connection with the 
crossing of the freeway at this point. (a) The nature of 
the grade separation between Center Street and the free-
way must be determined. The present proposal is that 
Center Street will underpass the freeway (R. 31). (b) The 
connection of the Bingham and Garfield Branch into Rio 
Grande's main line must be relocated. Rio Grande and the 
Road Commission have not yet agreed upon such relocation 
(R. 77-78, 87-88). (c) A determination must be made re-
specting the connection of the Little Cottonwood Branch 
into Rio Grande's main line. The Commission proposes that 
the entire branch be condemned and destroyed (R. 31). 
Although 51% of the right of way in the vicinity of the 
crossing in question has been secured the entire freeway 
is still in the planning stage. Interchanges with other high-
ways have not been fully determined and remain subjects 
of controversy. No construction whatever is now going 
forwarc1 in Salt Lake County on this freeway except for 
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work on the Beck's Overpass, and no contracts have been 
let for any such construction. It is estimated that three 
to five years from date of hearing on the motion will pass 
before any construction will take place (R. 37-40). 
On this state of fact the trial court upon the hearing 
on the Road Commission's motion made and entered the 
following finding and order. 
"This matter coming on regularly to be heard 
before the Court on the 24th day of September, 1957, 
on the motion of plaintiff for an order of immediate 
occupancy of the premises sought to be condemned 
in this action and the answer of the defendant to 
such motion ; evidence oral and documentary having 
been introduced by the parties and the matter hav-
ing been argued by counsel and submitted to the 
Court, and the Court being fully advised in the prem-
ises now finds that the evidence introduced at said 
hearing is insufficient to justify the issuance of an 
order permitting the plaintiff to immediately occupy 
the premises sought to be condemned pending the 
action, 
"It is therefore ORDERED that said motion be 
and the same is hereby denied." 
Of this finding and order the Road Commission com-
plains. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPE~ 
LANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCU-
PANCY. 
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(a) Appellant Could Obtain Immediate Occu-
pancy Only Upon Compliance With the Stat-
ute. 
(b) The Granting of an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy Rests in the Sound Discretion of 
the Trial Court. 
(c) The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Dis-
cretion in Denying Appellant's Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy. 
POINT II. 
THE POWER OF APPELLANT TO CONDEMN 
THE PROPERTY OF RESPONDENT IS NOT 
AFFECTED BY THE ORDER APPEALED 
FROM. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE OCCU-
PANCY. 
(a) Appellant Could Obtain Immediate Occu-
pancy Only Upon Compliance With the Stat-
ute. 
The legislature has conferred upon the Road Commis-
sion power to acquire real property or interests therein to 
be used in the construction, maintenance or operation of 
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State roads under the provisions of Section 27-2-9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended by Chapter 43, Laws 
of Utah, 1955. 
The power of the Road Commission to obtain immed-
iate occupancy of the premises pending the action is found 
in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which pro-
vides as follows: 
"78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending ac-
tion.-The plaintiff may move the court or a judge 
thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, 
on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the 
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, 
otherwise by serving a notice directed to him on 
the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the 
plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be con-
demned pending the action, and to do such work 
thereon as may be required for the easement sought 
according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof 
shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the 
value of the premises sought to be condemned and 
of the damages which will accrue from the con-
demnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy 
occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion 
according to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the 
motion is granted, the court or judge shall require 
the plaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to 
the defendant with sureties to be approved by the 
court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by the 
court or judge not less than double the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and the damages 
which will ensue from condemnation, as the same 
may appear to the court or judge on the hearing, 
and conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the 
premises and all damages in case the property is 
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condemned, and to pay all damages ar1smg from 
occupation before judgment in case the premises are 
not condemned, and all costs adjudged to the defen-
dant in the action. The sureties shall justify before 
the court or judge after a reasonable notice to the 
defendant of the time and place of justification. The 
amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the mo-
tion only, and shall not be admissible in evidence on 
final hearing. The court or judge may also, pending 
the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or 
interfering with the occupation of the premises and 
the doing thereon of the work required for the ease-
ment." 
Thus it appears clear that if the Road Commission is 
entitled to immediate occupancy of the Little Cottonwood 
Branch of Rio Grande, a showing must be made which will 
bring it within the authorization of the foregoing statute. 
(b) The Granting of an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy Rests in the Sound Discretion of 
the Trial Court. 
The rule is well established that the issuance of an 
order of immediate occupancy under a statute such as ours 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. This rule 
was announced in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham 
Consolidated Mining Co., et al., 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672, 
where this court, speaking through Justice Straup at page 
437 of the Utah Reports stated: 
"Under the statute it is apparent that the power 
of the court to grant or refuse an application to 
occupy premises sought to be condemned, 'pending 
the action,' is, to a large extent, discretionary, de-
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pending upon the showing of necessity for a speedy 
occupation. * * *" 
The same rule was announced by the Supreme Court 
of Colorado in People v. District Court, 17 Pac. 298, at page 
299, as follows : 
"* * * The rule granting possession pend-
ing the proceedings was discretionary, and might 
have been denied by the judge. In many cases insti-
tuted under this statute it is the duty of the judge 
to decline to enter such rule. * * *" 
In the exercise of its discretion the trial court under 
our statute should consider the following factors: 
{ 1) The value of the premises sought to be con-
demned. 
(2) The relative damages that will accrue to the 
parties. 
{ 3) The reasons requiring a speedy occupation. 
The foregoing factors mark the boundaries within 
which the discretion of the trial court may be exercised. 
A consideration of these factors conclusively shows that 
the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying 
the motion of the Road Commission. 
{c) The Trial Court Properly Exercised Its Dis-
cretion in Denying Appellant's Motion for 
Immediate Occupancy. 
The essential factors here in determining whether the 
Road Commission was entitled to immediate occupancy of 
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the Little Cottonwood Branch of Rio Grande are the rela-
tive damage accruing to the parties and the need for im-
mediate occupancy. We will therefore give consideration 
to each of these factors. 
In considering the damage which would be sustained 
by Rio Grande it was well recognized by court and counsel 
that if the court had entered the order requested, by the 
Road Commission, Rio Grande's Little Cottonwood Branch 
would have been forthwith destroyed (R. 24). The immediate 
effect would have been to terminate all of Rio Grande's op-
erations upon this branch with the loss of all revenue flow-
ing therefrom. More serious however would have been 
the effect on the industries served by Rio Grande on this 
branch. These industries are not parties to this action. 
They have not been served with any notice of these pro-
ceedings, yet had the court entered the order sought these 
parties would suddenly have found themselves without rail 
service. Railroads are highways, Oregon Short Line Rail-
road Company v. Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P. 2d 798, 
and upon the destruction of Rio Grande's branch of rail-
road this highway would instantly be closed to all such 
industries. At this stage of the case we have no means of 
knowing what the damage would be to such industries, but 
it may very well be substantial. 
We are unable to perceive any damage which has or 
would result to the Road Commission in being unable im-
mediately to seize this branch of railroad. It may very well 
be that the Road Commission will need to enter upon the 
railroad property for the purpose of making surveys, loca-
tions, maps, etc. They need not destroy the railroad in 
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order to do so for such right is expressly granted to them 
under Section 78-34-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
provides as follows : 
"78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and Ioca-
tion.-In all cases where land is required for public 
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such use 
may survey and locate the same; but it must be 
located in the manner which will be most compatible 
with the greatest public good and the least private 
injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter. 
The person, or his agent, in charge of such public 
use may enter upon the land and make examinations, 
surveys and maps thereof, and such entry shall 
constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners 
of the lands, except for injuries resulting from neg-
ligence, wantonness or malice." 
No serious contention can be made with respect to 
highway construction on Center Street. The work which 
was covered by the contract entered into in 1956 has now 
been completed. The further work on that street pursuant 
to the arrangement completed with Rio Grande and then 
abandoned by the Road Commission has been deferred 
pending the further development of the freeway project. 
No evidence was offered by the Road Commission indi-
cating any damage whatever resulting from being denied 
the right immediately to seize this line of railroad and we 
are firmly convinced that there is no damage whatever. 
Turning to the need for immediate occupancy we have 
here a situation in which a highway is now in the planning 
stage. Before the plan is completed at least two problems 
wholly separate from the condemnation of Rio Grande's 
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Little Cottonwood Branch, must be solved, the one relates 
to the crossing of Center Street by the freeway and the 
other has to do with the relocation of Rio Grande's Bingham 
and Garfield Branch. We have no doubt that all of the 
problems incident to the construction of the Valley free-
way will eventually be solved. We have no doubt that this 
freeway will be constructed. We are at a loss, however, 
to perceive how a project which will be in construction 
some three to five years in the future necessitates that the 
Road Commission shall today on summary procedure seize 
this branch of railroad. 
In its brief the Road Commission states : 
"* * * It will take from one to two years 
to fully plan the structures and the design of the 
highway so it is necessary to obtain immediate oc-
cupancy of the property involved in this action to 
accomplish the speedy construction of the highway." 
Appellant does not explain why it is necessary to seize 
the railroad in order to plan the structures. The design or 
plan of structures is made in the drafting office of the 
project engineers, miles removed from the physical loca-
tion. If any surveys are to be made upon the ground the 
Road Commission already has all necessary authority under 
said Section 78-34-5, supra. How then can it seriously be 
contended that a present seizure is necessary to engage in 
planning for future construction. 
It seems clear to us that the legislature intended by 
the provisions of said Section 78-34-9 that a project must 
be advanced beyond the stage of planning to justify an 
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immediate occupation of premises. Construction must bE 
authorized and either in progress or in preparation of im. 
mediate commencement. Counsel cite Home Gas Com pan~ 
v. Kuruc, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 316. The basis for the order o1 
occupancy in that case is stated by the court at page 321 
as follows: 
"The plaintiff has applied to this Court by a 
separate motion, returnable June 21, 1954 for im-
mediate temporary possession of the easement in-
volved in these proceedings. The Court reserved 
decision until after the trial. It appearing to the 
Court from plaintiff's moving papers and from the 
evidence on the trial, that the plaintiff is now ready 
to commence construction, and it further appearing 
that the need is immediate and urgent to increase the 
supply of natural gas in this area at the earliest pos-
sible date, and it appearing to the satisfaction of this 
Court that the public interest would be prejudiced 
by the delay, it is the determination of this Court, 
that the plaintiff should be granted immediate tem-
porary possession of the easement which it seeks to 
condemn in these proceedings." 
In Town Superintendent of Highways of Frankfurt, 
87 N. Y. S. 2d 453, likewise cited by counsel, the facts are 
not shown. The court at page 455 merely stated that: 
"From the facts before this Court, it does ap-
pear that the public interest will be prejudiced by 
delay in the above matter, and the section does 
offer relief that would prevent the public interests 
from being prejudiced by such delay." 
Appellant appears to rely upon State Road Commission 
v. Franklin, 95 A. 2d 99. That case was decided, however, 
under constitutional and statutory provisions which ex-
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pressly authorized the Road Commission to take possession 
of the property being condemned prior to construction. We 
find no provisions of our constitution or statute authorizing 
such procedure. The legislature may, subject to state and 
federal constitutional limitations, enlarge the powers of 
the Road Commission but until further legislative action 
is taken the Road Commission is restricted by the statutory 
provisions cited above. It should be observed further in 
this connection that under many of the statutes the body 
exercising the power of eminent domain is required upon 
taking immediate possession to deposit into court the esti-
mated value of the property being condemned. In this 
jurisdiction, however, since the decision in Barnes v. Wade, 
90 Utah 1, 58 P. 2d 297, the Road Commission may take 
immediate possession without the furnishing of bond or 
the depositing of any award. We would think that if the 
legislature saw fit to extend the powers of the Road Com-
mission to permit immediate occupancy for the purpose of 
planning highways which may be constructed three to five 
years in the future, it would require a deposit of an award 
to protect the property owner against damages resulting 
from a dismissal of the action because of a change in plan. 
Regardless of what the legislature may see fit to do 
for the future we submit that under the facts presented on 
appellant's motion and under the present statute the trial 
court properly denied the motion for immediate occupancy. 
POINT II. 
THE POWER OF APPELLANT TO CONDEMN 
THE PROPERTY OF RESPONDENT IS NOT 
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AFFECTED BY THE ORDER APPEALED 
FROM. 
Appellant in its second point urges that the Road Com-
mission has a more necessary public use of the premises 
sought to be condemned than has Rio Grande. We are un-
certain of the precise contention which appellant makes 
under this point. Does appellant contend that a more neces-
sary public use ipso facto entitles the Road Commission to 
immediate occupancy. If such is the point of the conten-
tion we think it is without merit. The right of the Road 
Commission to obtain immediate occupancy depends, as 
we have shown, upon its ability to make a proper showing 
under the statute. Unless such a showing can be made, as 
the statutes now stand, the Road Commission cannot im-
mediately occupy the premises. The trial court properly 
found that the evidence was insufficient to support the 
motion and properly denied the same. 
If the appellant contends that the issue of more nec-
essary public use was involved in or decided by the trial 
court in passing upon the motion for immediate occupancy, 
then appellant misconceives the nature of the motion for 
immediate occupancy and the effect of the denial of such 
motion. 
In Utah Copper Co. v. lJfontana-Bingham Consolidated 
lJf.ining Co., supra,, this court laid at rest the question of 
the nature of orders permitting immediate occupancy in 
condemnation cases. In that case, on motion for immediate 
occupancy the trial court entered an order to the effect 
that plaintiff had a right to condemn and to take possession 
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pending final determination. Upon further hearing plain-
tiff offered to introduce further evidence on the right to 
condemn. The offer was objected to and the objection sus-
tained. Complaint was made of the ruling. In commenting 
on the ruling this court, at page 435 of the Utah Report, 
said: 
"* * * It is urged by the respondent and 
denied by the appellant that the order granting im-
mediate possession and occupancy was res adjudi-
cata as to the right of the plaintiff to condemn and 
occupy the premises, and that the only remaining 
question to be determined was the amount of dam-
ages. On the contrary, the appellant contends that 
the order was merely interlocutory and during the 
pendency of the proceedings was subject to modifi-
cation or to be vacated as circumstances and condi-
tions might require, and, being interlocutory, the 
defendant was entitled to be further heard on the 
question of the plaintiff's right to condemn and 
take or possess the premises. We think the conten-
tion of the appellant in such respect is well founded. 
* * * * 
"Under the statute it is apparent that the power 
of the court to grant or refuse an application to 
occupy premises sought to be condemned, 'pending 
the action,' is, to a large extent, discretionary, de-
pending upon the showing of necessity for a speedy 
occupation. To wisely exercise the discretion the 
court might well require the plaintiff to make a 
showing, not only as to the necessity for a sp~edy 
occupation, but also a prima facie showing as to his 
- right to condemn, if that right be controverted. It 
also would seem, from the language of the statute, 
that the plaintiff may move the court, etc., to occupy 
the premises sought to be condemned, 'pending the 
action,' and requiring the giving of a bond 'to pay 
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all damages arising from occupation before judg-
ment in case the premises are not condemned,' that 
an order permitting immediate possession 'pending 
the action' would be interlocutory and not final, and 
on the face of the order itself it appears that it per-
mitted the possession and occupancy 'pending the 
action and until the further order of the court,' and 
thus was intended to be merely interlocutory. When 
the cause was finally submitted as to all of the 
issues, the court made findings and conclusions and 
rendered a decree upon all of the issues, including 
the questions or issues that the use of the premises 
applied for was a public use and authorized under 
the statute, that the taking was necessary for such 
use, and that the plaintiff was entitled to exercise 
the right of eminent domain. Thus, because of the 
statute and the nature of the orders the first grant-
ing possession pending the action and until the fur-
the order of the court and the second a perpetual 
occupancy, we think the first order was interlocu-
tory and the second final. Templeton v. District 
Court, 47 Cal. 70; People v. District Court, 11 Colo. 
147, 17 P. 298." 
The trial court in the case at bar carefully avoided 
passing upon any question relative to the ultimate rights 
of the parties. It confined itself strictly to the matter 
which it was called upon to decide under the motion, namely, 
whether at that stage of the proceedings the Road Com-
mission was entitled to occupy Rio Grande's branch of rail-
road. Under the rule announced in the Utah Copper Com-
pany case, supra, the order of the court denying the motion 
is merely interlocutory. It in no way impairs or affects 
the ultimate rights of the parties which must be determined 
upon the trial of the case. 
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Due process of law and orderly judicial procedure 
require that the proceedings go forward for trial at which 
both parties may have an opportunity to offer evidence and 
be fully heard on every issue which may require a determ-
ination on the merits. If on the evidence presented at such 
trial there is an issue on the question of a more necessary 
public use or the power of appellant to condemn the prop-
erty in question the trial court can and will on the evidence 
then before it determine any such issues. No such issues 
were considered by the trial court on the motion and none 
are before this court on this appeal. Until any such issues 
are properly presented, heard and decided any rights which 
appellant may have are in no manner impaired or affected 
by the interlocutory order now appealed from. It there-
fore becomes unnecessary to consider the cases cited by 
appellant on its second point. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
CONCLUSION 
We are concerned here only with the question of 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying ap-
pellant's motion for immediate occupation of respondent's 
Little Cottonwood Branch of railroad. There was no actual 
showing at the hearing on such motion of a need for a 
present occupation of such railroad. The substance of 
appellant's contention is that the issuance of the order for 
immediate occupancy is necessary to plan a highway to be 
constructed in the future. Our statute permits the issuance 
of such an order only in cases where a need for an actual 
speedy occupation is shown. The motion was therefore 
properly denied. The order is interlocutory only. It is no 
manner affects or impairs the ultimate rights of the par-
ties. These are preserved pending a determination by the 
trial court upon the merits. 
The order of the trial court should therefore be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
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